利用大数据和预测分析优化供应链（琦文分享五十二）

分享兴趣，传播快乐，增长见闻，留下美好。亲爱的您，这里是LearningYard学苑！

Share interests, spread happiness, increase knowledge, and leave beauty behind. Dear you, this is LearningYard Academy!

今天的琦文分享栏目将带领大家学习博士论文《基于政府规制的绿色供应链动态决策研究》的第六章节。

Today's Qi Wen sharing program will lead you to study your master's thesis "Factors affecting bidding strategy of national collective procurement drugs from the perspective of game Theory".

引言部分逻辑：制造业企业遇到了什么问题是其为了发展而必须去面对的，政府又承担了怎样的角色，政府一方面应当对绿色企业进行合理的补贴，另一方面需要对企业是否履行绿色行为进行监督检查，对非绿色行为企业给予一定的惩罚。而这个动态的博弈过程作者做出了以下研究。

Introduction to logic: manufacturing enterprises encountered what problem is the must to face, for the development of government and how the role, the government shall give reasonable subsidies to green enterprise on one hand, on the other hand, companies need to fulfill the green behavior, conducting supervision and inspection to the enterprise for a certain green behavior punishment. And this dynamic game process the author makes the following study.

随后，作者从系统动力学对政府环境政策的制定及绿色供应链的动态问题进行了文献综述。作者运用系统动力学和演化博弈论相结合的方法对政府、供应商、制造商三方的决策行为进行研究。分析供应商、制造商和政府单方群体的演化过程，提出各群体演化路径及前提条件。

Then, the author reviews the literature on the development of government environmental policy and the dynamics of green supply chain from the perspective of system dynamics. The author uses the method of system dynamics and evolutionary game theory to study the decision-making behavior of the government, suppliers and manufacturers. The evolution process of supplier, manufacturer and government is analyzed, and the evolution path and precondition of each group are put forward.

随后，作者构建三方博弈模型，其参数假设如下图所示：

Subsequently, the author constructs a three-party game model, and its parameter assumptions are shown in the figure below:

然后分别构建有、无政府监管下三方的收益矩阵。然后根据复制动态方程的求解方法，求解三方各自的演化博弈分析。

Then, the income matrix of three parties with and without supervision is constructed respectively. Then the evolutionary game analysis of the three parties is solved according to the solution method of the replication dynamic equation.

供应商：

制造商：

政府：

将供应商、制造商和政府的复制动态方程联立，得到三方的复制动力系统为 ，并根据现实情况，对演化均衡点进行分析。若双方均为非绿色企业，即初始状态不采取绿色行为，则即使政府进行监管实施奖惩制度，企业双方仍保持非绿色生产；在政府监管下，供应商开始生产绿色原材料，而制造商保持非绿色生产仍能获得较高收益，此时若制造商开始实施绿色生产，则使得制造商收益的进一步增加，即使政府减弱监管力度，双方仍然保持绿色行为。

The replication dynamic equations of the supplier, the manufacturer and the government are simultaneous, and the replication dynamic system of the three parties is obtained, and the equilibrium point of evolution is analyzed according to the reality. If both parties are non-green enterprises, that is, they do not adopt green behaviors in the initial state, then both parties still maintain non-green production even if the government carries out supervision and implementation of reward and punishment system. Under the supervision of the government, suppliers start to produce green raw materials, while manufacturers keep non-green production, they can still obtain higher profits. At this time, if manufacturers start to implement green production, the profits of manufacturers will further increase. Even if the government weakens the supervision, both sides still maintain green behaviors.

基于上述研究，作者给出了相应的建议。

Based on the above research, the authors give corresponding suggestions.

今天的分享就到这里了。如果您对今天的文章有独特的想法，欢迎给我们留言，让我们相约明天，祝您今天过得开心快乐！

That's all for today's sharing. If you have a unique idea for today's article, feel free to leave a message and let's meet tomorrow. I wish you a happy and happy day!

参考资料：谷歌翻译

参考文献：《基于政府规制的绿色供应链动态决策研究》（源自知网）

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