推荐10个写论文必备的神仙网站（琦文分享四十三）

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今天的琦文分享栏目将带领大家学习博士论文《政府技术采购中的创新激励机制研究》的第八章结论与展望。

Today's Qiwen sharing column will lead you to study the conclusions and prospects of Chapter 8 of the doctoral dissertation "Research on the Innovation Incentive Mechanism in Government Technology Procurement".

作者攥写结论部分，分为了两章。分别是主要结论和研究展望。首先作者指出，与常规的政府采购相比，政府技术采购会存在的道德风险和逆向选择问题，正是因为该原因的存在，便有了激励机制存在的必要性。于是作者研究了五种不同的激励机制，并得到了如下结论。

The author holds the conclusion part, which is divided into two chapters. They are the main conclusions and research prospects. First of all, the author points out that, compared with conventional government procurement, there are moral hazard and adverse selection problems in government technology procurement. It is precisely because of the existence of this reason that there is a necessity for the existence of an incentive mechanism. So the authors studied five different incentive mechanisms and came to the following conclusions.

作者首先讲述了本节的主要动作：政府技术采购中采购的是尚未成形的、创新性的产品或技术，需要承包商进行研究开发，因而采购过程不可避免的面临着技术、成本等方面的不确定性。不同的成本分担激励契约为承包商的研发努力提供了不同程度的激励。分别考察了在风险中性的政府采购方和风险规避的承包商组成的采购供应链中信息对称和非对称情形下成本分担的线性激励契约，探讨成本分担率、固定支付和不确定性程度等因素对承包商的 R&D 努力的影响，发现最优的固定支付和成本分担系数。然后总结出本节的重要结论。

The author first describes the main actions of this section: government technology procurement purchases unformed and innovative products or technologies, which require contractors to conduct research and development, so the procurement process inevitably faces inconsistencies in technology and cost. certainty. Different cost-sharing incentive contracts provide different levels of incentives for contractors' R&D efforts. The linear incentive contracts for cost sharing in the case of information symmetric and asymmetric information in the procurement supply chain composed of risk-neutral government purchasers and risk-averse contractors are respectively investigated, and the cost sharing rate, fixed payment and degree of uncertainty are discussed. Factors affecting the contractor's R&D efforts to find the optimal fixed payment and cost-sharing coefficients. Then summarize the important conclusions of this section.

作者首先指出本节的重要工作，考虑政府采购方对承包商的 R&D 成本具有不完全信息的情况下，将收益共享机制与谈判方式结合，通过采购方多轮出价让承包商选择接受或拒绝，来激励承包商逐步揭示自己真实的R&D 效率的信息，并决定对 R&D 收益的分配，然后建立动态博弈模型，发现采购方和承包商的均衡策略。然后总结本章的重要结论。

The author first points out the important work of this section, considering that the government purchaser has incomplete information on the contractor's R&D cost, combining the revenue sharing mechanism with the negotiation method, and letting the contractor choose to accept or reject through multiple rounds of bidding by the purchaser. To encourage contractors to gradually reveal their real R&D efficiency information, and to decide the distribution of R&D benefits, and then establish a dynamic game model to find the equilibrium strategy of the purchaser and the contractor. Then summarize the important conclusions of this chapter.

作者首先指出本章的重点工作：研发竞赛是政府进行技术采购的常用形式，政府采购方作为竞赛的发起者以事先规定的价格向取得最佳创新成果的竞赛参与人采购。假设研发质量具有随机性，建立了研发竞赛的非合作博弈模型，分别探讨了信息对称和信息非对称情况下竞赛参与人与竞赛发起者的最优策略，包括竞赛参与人如何决定自己的 R&D 投入，以及竞赛发起者如何确定固定奖励即采购价格。然后总结本章的重要结论。

The author first points out the key work of this chapter: R&D competition is a common form of technology procurement by the government. The government purchaser, as the initiator of the competition, purchases from the competition participants who have achieved the best innovation results at a predetermined price. Assuming that R&D quality is random, a non-cooperative game model of R&D competition is established, and the optimal strategies of competition participants and competition initiators under the condition of information symmetry and information asymmetry are discussed respectively, including how competition participants decide their own R&D investment. , and how the contest sponsor determines the fixed reward, the purchase price. Then summarize the important conclusions of this chapter.

作者首先指出本章的重点工作：本章在供应商和政府采购方组成的两层供应链的基础上引入消费市场，考察了基于拍卖的不同订单分配机制对供应商R&D投入的激励效应，建立博弈模型比较了三种不同的订单分配机制下供应商的均衡R&D努力与报价，发现哪一种订单分配机制是最优的。然后总结本章的重要结论。

The author first points out the key work of this chapter: this chapter introduces the consumer market on the basis of the two-tier supply chain composed of suppliers and government purchasers, examines the incentive effect of different order allocation mechanisms based on auctions on suppliers' R&D investment, and establishes a game model. The equilibrium R&D efforts and quotations of suppliers under three different order allocation mechanisms are compared, and it is found which order allocation mechanism is optimal. Then summarize the important conclusions of this chapter.

作者首先指出本章的重点工作：本章构建了由两个竞争的供应商、一个政府采购机构和最终消费者组成的供应链，然后分别考虑对供应商总额补贴、对供应商单位补贴和对消费者单位补贴三种不同形式下，政府的价格补贴对供应商的 R&D 努力和社会剩余的影响，发现何种机制是最优的。然后总结本章的重要结论。

The author first points out the key work of this chapter: this chapter constructs a supply chain consisting of two competing suppliers, a government procurement agency and the final consumer, and then considers the total subsidy to suppliers, the subsidy to supplier units, and the subsidy to consumers respectively. Under three different forms of unit subsidy, the government's price subsidy affects the supplier's R&D efforts and social surplus, and finds which mechanism is optimal. Then summarize the important conclusions of this chapter.

最后，作者指出未来的研究方向：1.双边的信息不对称；2.拓展供应商数量；3.考虑传统产品和创新产品之间的市场竞争。

Finally, the author points out the future research directions: 1. Bilateral information asymmetry; 2. Expand the number of suppliers; 3. Consider market competition between traditional products and innovative products.

今天的分享就到这里了。如果您对今天的文章有独特的想法，欢迎给我们留言，让我们相约明天，祝您今天过得开心快乐！

That's it for today's sharing. If you have unique ideas for today's article, please leave us a message, let us meet tomorrow, I wish you a happy day!

参考资料：谷歌翻译

参考文献：《政府技术采购中的创新激励机制研究》（源自知网）

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